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Abstract—Market mechanisms are now playing a key role
in allocating and pricing on-demand transportion services. In
practice, most such services use posted-price mechanisms, where
both passengers and drivers are offered a journey price which
they can accept or reject. However, providers such as Liftago and
GrabTaxi have begun to adopt a mechanism whereby auctions are
used to price drivers. These latter mechanisms are neither posted-
price nor classical double auctions, and can instead be considered
a hybrid mechanism. In this paper, we describe and study the
properties of a novel hybrid on-demand transport mechanism.
As these mechanisms require knowledge of passenger demand,
we analyze the data-profit tradeoff as well as how passenger
and driver preferences influence mechanism performance. We
show that the revenue loss for the provider scales with
√
n logn
for n passenger requests under a multi-armed bandit learning
algorithm with beta distributed preferences. We also investigate
the effect of subsidies on both profit and the number of successful
journeys allocated by the mechanism, comparing these with a
posted-price mechanism, showing improvements in profit with a
comparable number of successful requests.
Index Terms—On-demand transport, taxis, pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
An important component of the transportation infrastructure
in any city is on-demand or demand-responsive transport. As
the name suggests, the timetable and route of these services
are not fixed, contrasting with the operation of most trains and
buses. As such, on-demand transport (ODT) is useful for last
mile transportation—from hubs to residences—and also for
areas with low populations or passengers with special needs
(e.g., the elderly and disabled) [1].
ODT services can be not-for-profit, municipality funded, or
profit driven. Although all types of services are often present
in a city, they face different challenges. In particular, the
routing and scheduling problems (where to go and when to
pick up each passenger) in—typically small-scale—not-for-
profit services are typically solved in a centralized manner
and aim to minimize costs [1]–[9]. This is due to long-term
revenue guarantees from the municipality or local government.
On the other hand, profit-driven ODT services have tradi-
tionally been dominated by taxis. Here, revenue from each
passenger must be accounted for in routing and scheduling.
Moreover, the taxi company and drivers have a restricted abil-
ity to optimize pricing, due to regulation [10]–[12]. As such,
factors such as how each passenger is priced, how much each
driver is paid, where taxis wait, and which passengers they
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pick-up play an important role both for minimizing passenger
waiting times and fares, and for improving the profits of each
driver and the taxi company. Optimizing pricing, scheduling,
and routing in this environment is challenging, although signif-
icant progress has been made under the assumption of slowly
time-varying pricing, where the problem can be reduced to a
minimum cost scheduling and routing problem [5], [6], [10]–
[18].
Recently, ODT providers such as UberX1 have been using
machine learning techniques to improve routing, scheduling
and pricing. In contrast with taxi companies, these ODT
providers exploit market mechanisms to price and allocate
passengers and drivers. In this case, studied in [19]–[24],
up-front prices can be set using information gleaned from
large amounts of data (e.g., collected via smartphone apps),
and can be dynamically adjusted to account for time, supply
and demand, and pick-up and drop-off locations—a significant
departure from the static approaches used by traditional taxis.
The use of market mechanisms for pricing and allocation
[25]–[27] is raising new challenges for the design of ODT sys-
tems. In particular, modern ODT providers are using a range of
market mechanisms, not limited to the posted-price approach
[16], [28]–[31] currently adopted by Uber, where passengers
and drivers are offered prices that they can accept or reject. For
example, Liftago2 has adopted a hybrid mechanism where the
payment received by drivers is determined by an auction and
the price paid by passengers is determined by a posted-price
mechanism. At present, it is not clear how to determine which
mechanism is best suited to each city and scale of provider,
beyond financially risky real-world experimentation.
There are two main approaches to study market design for
on-demand transport. The first relies on tools from economics
in the form of equlibrium analysis. In particular, equilibrium
conditions have been derived and solutions studied in work
such as [11], [32]–[34]. The main conclusions from this analy-
sis are structural properties of the relationship between market
supply and demand in the aggregate; that is, equilibrium
behavior of passengers and drivers. While this analysis yields
useful high-level insights for regulators, it is not presently
possible to use these frameworks to optimize the market
mechanism itself for individual providers. However, we note
that the simulation-based method to study stochastic user
equilibria accounting for within-day operating policies in [34]
appears promising in this respect.
The second approach is to develop and compare partic-
ular market mechanisms over fixed periods of time, using
agent-based modeling approaches. These mechanisms usually
take the form of posted-price approaches, and here, several
1https://www.uber.com/
2https://www.liftago.com/
2mechanisms have been proposed [10], [13], [14], [16], [19]–
[24], [35], [36]. Typically, these approaches either assume
passengers will accept all journeys at a given price or rely on
passengers and drivers truthfully revealing their preferences in
the form of maximum prices, waiting times and other factors
such as vehicle type (e.g., [22]–[24]). The assumption that
passengers are willing to reveal the maximum price they are
prepared to pay is problematic, as often passenger preferences
are not well-defined as this is not the way ODTs are currently
used. Nevertheless, market mechanisms that assume that pas-
sengers and drivers have private price preferences is currently
limited to [19]–[21], [35]–[37].
In this paper, we introduce a new hybrid mechanism for
ODT services to resolve the tension between supply and
demand, where passengers are offered a price they can accept
or reject and driver payments and allocations are determined
by an auction. That is, like [19]–[21], [35]–[37], passengers
and drivers are not required to perfectly reveal their price
preferences. Moreover, we do not assume that passengers are
prepared to bid (e.g., [19], [20], [37]) nor that drivers receive
a salary (as in [21], [35], [36]).
There are two key questions that we address: (1) how
does the availability of data affect the price that should
be offered by the service? and (2) how do passenger and
driver cost and profit preferences affect the performance of
the mechanism? The first question concerns data availability,
taking into account the possibility of offering cheaper fares to
obtain more information about passenger pricing preferences.
It has a direct influence on the effectiveness of the machine
learning techniques used to optimize pricing and allocation
within the mechanism. This also includes algorithms that are
used to estimate demand and trip information [15], [38]–[40]
as well as market formation [41], which determines which
passengers can be allocated to each driver. In contrast, the
second question considers properties which the mechanism
cannot control, as such driver and passenger preferences are
determined a priori due to social, cultural and geographic
factors; including the presence of consumer habits [42].
To evaluate our hybrid mechanism, we develop an agent-
based model which captures preferences of individual passen-
gers with respect to journey prices, and drivers with respect to
their minimum profit requirements per journey. Our model can
be viewed as an extension of [19], [36] where both passengers
and drivers are self-interested. We formally demonstrate sev-
eral properties of the hybrid mechanism, including truthfulness
of passenger and driver reports, tradeoffs between profit and
historical data available to the provider, and the impact of
preferences on provider profit.
We also propose two variations on the hybrid mechanism
to improve the proportion of passengers that are transported
by a driver (which we refer to as the mechanism’s efficiency).
That is, both the passenger accepts the price offered by the
mechanism and there is a driver willing to transport the
passenger. These variations are inspired by the social planning
perspective in auctions [29] and incorporate variations in
the prices passengers are prepared to pay and subsidies to
incentivize drivers to transport each passenger.
Ultimately, the performance of a mechanism for an ODT
system depends on the long-term behavior of the mechanism,
accounting for the system’s spatial-temporal profile. In par-
ticular, the spatial distribution of passenger requests, where
drivers without passengers wait, and the passenger drop-off
locations all affect key system metrics, namely the profit of
the provider, the prices passengers pay, and the daily profits
of drivers. As such, we provide a system-level evaluation of
our hybrid mechanism and compare it to existing mechanisms
for taxis as well as a two-sided posted-price mechanism
inspired by the approach adopted by Uber. We show that
the hybrid mechanism can significantly outperform a two-
sided posted-price mechanism in terms of the profit, while
maintaining comparable success rates. We also investigate
provider subsidies, which further improve the success rate at
the cost of a lower profit.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we detail our system model. In Section III, we
apply this model to existing ODT services, providing us with
a basis for comparison. Section IV, introduces the proposed
hybrid mechanism, and in Section V, we analyze the hybrid
mechanism to investigate tradeoffs between the quantity of
data and imperfect knowledge of system parameters on the
profit. In Section VI, two variations on the hybrid mechanism
to vary the tradeoff between profit and proportion of passen-
gers successfully transported are proposed. In Section VII,
we explain our simulation setup and investigate the effect of
system parameters on profit and success rate for the hybrid
mechanism, a two-sided posted-price mechanism and the tra-
ditional dispatcher taxi model. In Section VIII, we summarize
our work and consider future extensions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we develop an agent-based model for the
ODT system which forms a basis for our hybrid mechanism
in Section IV. We consider an ODT system consisting of
a provider (responsible for pricing passengers and matching
these with drivers), d vehicles/drivers who each service a
single passenger at a time (i.e., ridesharing is not supported),
and n passengers that enter the system at different times.
A. Passenger Agent Model
A new passenger enters the system when she makes a
journey request to the ODT provider, which consists of a pick-
up time, pick-up location and drop-off location. We assume
that each passenger wishes to be picked up as soon as possible
after she makes her request, with maximum delay of ∆
minutes. The pick-up and drop-off locations are represented
by elements from the set of vertices V in the directed graph
G = (V,E), which models the underlying road network. The
set of edges E in the graph represent direct routes between
locations in V that can be traversed by the vehicles. Associated
to each edge e ∈ E are a start and end location u,w ∈ V
respectively; a cost ce ∈ [0,∞) for a vehicle to traverse edge
e; and a traversal time τe ∈ Z+.
The cost of traversing an edge is incurred due to factors such
as fuel consumption and vehicle wear and tear. We assume that
the edge cost ce and traversal time τe are computed offline by
3solving the shortest path problem between u and w in the
underlying road network.
Each passenger has a maximum price she is prepared to pay
for her journey, which is private and unknown to the provider.
The maximum price is determined by the maximum price-
rate that the passenger is prepared to pay (in, for example,
euros per kilometer) and the distance the passenger seeks
to travel. Let Ri denote the distance that passenger i seeks
to travel, then the total price she is willing to pay for her
journey is pi,max = ri,maxRi, where ri,max is the passenger’s
maximum price-rate. Since Ri is known to both passenger i
and the provider, it follows that the passenger’s preferences are
completely characterized by the maximum price-rate ri,max.
As such, if a passenger is offered a journey with price-rate
ri ≤ ri,max it will be accepted and if ri > ri,max the offer
will be rejected (assuming that they can be picked up for the
journey within ∆ minutes).
We model the maximum price-rate for each passenger as an
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) random vari-
able, which captures differences in how much each passenger
is prepared to pay. Following [36], we assume that ri,max is
beta distributed with probability density function (pdf)
frmax(x) =
1
ρmaxB(αr, βr)
(
x
ρmax
)αr−1(
1− x
ρmax
)βr−1
(1)
where B(αr, βr) =
Γ(αr)Γ(βr)
Γ(αr+βr)
is the beta function and Γ(·)
is the gamma function. As such, the maximum price-rate is
influenced by the three parameters αr, βr, ρmax, where αr, βr
affect the shape of the pdf and ρmax determines the support
of the pdf [0, ρmax].
The choice of the beta distribution to model passenger price
preferences can be justified by the flexibility arising from
the three parameters and its tractability. We also remark that
the beta distribution has also been applied to model revenue
in economics (see, e.g., [43]) and that the parameters can
be readily estimated using via techniques such as maximum
likelihood and method of moments [44]. Variations in the
parameters can arise due to changes in perceived supply and
demand (i.e., the number of available taxis and the number
of passenger requests) or social, cultural and spatial-temporal
differences (such as time of day) between passengers.
B. Driver Agent Model
Drivers also have preferences for the minimum payment
they are prepared to receive for transporting passengers. Driver
j’s profit from transporting passenger i is given by
Sj,i = (1− ηj)riRi − cj,i (2)
where ηj is the proportion of the passenger’s payment sent to
the provider and cj,i is the cost of transportation. In particular,
cj,i = κj(Ri +Rj,i) (3)
where κj is the cost per kilometer incurred by the driver and
Rj,i denotes the distance from driver j’s initial location to
passenger i’s pick-up location.
Let Sj,min denote the minimum profit per minute driver j
is prepared to receive for a journey. We assume that driver j
is only willing to transport passenger i if
Sj,i ≥ Sj,minτj,i (4)
where τj,i is the duration of travel from driver j’s initial
location and passenger i’s drop-off location. As such, both the
journey distance and duration are accounted for by the driver.
As for each passenger’s price-rate, we assume that Sj,min is
an i.i.d beta distributed random variable (albeit with different
parameters) with pdf given by
fSmin(x) =
1
σmaxB(αd, βd)
(
x
σmax
)αd−1(
1− x
σmax
)βd−1
(5)
where αd, βd are the shape parameters and the support is
[0, σmax]. These parameters are affected by variations in
perceived supply and demand or spatial-temporal differences
between drivers.
We assume that the provider is aware of which drivers are
available and which are busy at all times. This information can
either be obtained directly from driver reports or a notification
from passengers being transported.
C. Provider Agent Model
The ODT provider runs the mechanism that prices and
allocates passengers and drivers. In return, the provider re-
ceives a proportion of each passenger’s payment. In particular,
the provider receives ηjriRi for passenger i when served by
driver j, which corresponds to the fraction of the passenger’s
payment not given to driver j in exchange for transportation.
To perform pricing and allocation, the provider exploits
statistical knowledge of passenger preferences for the price-
rate and driver preferences for their minimum profit. This sta-
tistical knowledge corresponds to the parameters αr, βr, ρmax
and αd, βd, σmax which must be learned from historical trans-
actions. When learned, such parameters will typically be
imperfect due to, for example, limited data or non-stationarity
of passenger preferences. To distinguish between the actual
pdfs for the preferences, frmax , fSmin , and the statistical
knowledge of the provider, we denote the estimated pdfs as
fˆrmax with parameters αˆr, βˆr, ρˆmax and fˆSmin with parameters
αˆd, βˆd, σˆmax, respectively.
In the following sections, we overview the evolution of
existing ODT mechanisms and introduce a hybrid mechanism
which exploits techniques from the theory of online mecha-
nisms to obtain parameters for the preference pdfs.
III. MODELING EXISTING ODT MECHANISMS
In order to motivate the design of our hybrid mechanism,
we overview existing mechanisms in ODT. We formalize
each mechanism within the context of the model detailed in
Section II, which allows us to form a basis for comparison
with our proposed hybrid mechanism.
Historically, the dispatcher and Hackney carriage mecha-
nisms were the first mechanisms used to price and allocate
passengers in ODT systems. In the absence of smartphone
4apps, it was difficult for providers, drivers and passengers to
effectively characterize the spatial-temporal properties of the
system and to communicate with each other.
In the Hackney carriage mechanism, passengers commu-
nicate with drivers by hailing from the side of the road,
which only allowed passengers to select from drivers within
a distance of approximately 100 meters of their pick-up
location. Passengers’ prices are set by the driver based on a
combination of experience, provider requirements, and region-
specific regulations. Payments to a provider (which is often
some licensing authority) by drivers are set either in terms of
a percentage commission for each journey or a fixed amount
paid on a regular basis (e.g., monthly).
The limited choice of drivers for passengers to select is
partly resolved by the dispatcher mechanism. In particular,
passengers are able to call a provider who then forwards their
request to a larger number of drivers within their region, often
via a radio network. A driver is then selected based on a heuris-
tic rule implemented by the provider. However, the heuristic
does not usually include any information about the price the
driver intends to offer the passenger as this information is not
available to the provider. Pricing is therefore performed in a
similar fashion to the Hackney carriage mechanism.
It is informative to formalize the pricing algorithm used
in the Hackney carriage and dispatcher mechanisms in the
case where the provider seeks to maximize its profit. Without
historical data, the provider can set prices based only on
average properties of the ODT system, including driver travel
distances and durations, how drivers are selected, minimum
profit targets, and maximum prices that passengers will pay.
An example of a model based on the average properties
of the ODT system has been proposed in [10], [45]. In this
model, the average waiting time is given by
W =
ω
pNT − DLγ
(6)
where ω depends on the density of taxi stands, p is the
proportion of available taxis, NT is the total number of
taxis, γ is the average number of passengers per journey,
L is the average travel time, and D is the average number
of passengers served by the whole taxi system. As such,
pNT − DLγ represents the average number of available taxis.
This kind of model forms the basis of optimization problems
to maximize revenue and the number of served passengers
[10], [45]. In particular, the average monetary and time cost
of a trip in time period i is given by
Di(F i, Li,W i) = Di exp
(
β
(
F i
γ
+ ψ1L
i + ψ2W
i
))
(7)
where F i is the average fare price, Li is the average travel
time, W i is the average waiting time given by (6), β > 0
is a sensitivity parameter, and ψ1, ψ2 are parameters used to
convert time costs into monetary costs. Often this approach
is studied within the framework of multiperiod pricing [10],
[16] however, it is not able to capture the individual private
preferences of passengers and drivers.
On the other hand, within our model detailed in Section II,
the Hackney carriage and taxi mechanisms can be formalized
as follows. Consider passenger i and driver j, with prices set
via the optimization problem
max
ri,ηj
ERi,Rj,i,τj,i,κj
[
riRiηjP
(
Sj,minτj,i + κj(Ri +Rj,i)
1− ηj
≤ rRi ≤ ri,maxRi
)]
(8)
Intuitively, this optimization problem maximizes the expected
profit from each passenger request over all possible distances
and duration Ri, Rj,i, τj,i, κj . To see this, observe that the
probability that both passenger i and driver j accept their
prices is given by
P (Sj,minτj,i ≤ (1− ηj)riRi − κj(Ri +Rj,i), ri ≤ ri,max)
(9)
Since the provider receives a profit of ηjriRi, it follows by
rearranging that the expected profit is precisely the objective in
(8), where we have accounted for the probability that both the
passenger and driver accept the prices (the provider receives
nothing if one or both reject their offer).
In general, the problem in (8) cannot be solved directly due
to the intractability of the distributions involved and limited
knowledge of the distributions of Sj,min and ri,max. As such,
one approach to set prices is to decouple the passenger and
driver pricing subproblems, which leads to the choices of
rH,i = arg max
r
ERi [rRiP(r ≤ ri,max)]
ηH,j = arg max
η
ERi,Rj,i,τj,i,κj
[
ηP
(
Sj,min + κj(Ri +Rj,i)
1− η ≤ riRi
)]
(10)
As for (8), prices in (10) are averaged over distance and dura-
tion parameters. This means that the prices are not dynamically
adjusted depending on the real-time state of the ODT system.
We remark that a multiperiod model based on (6) has
also been proposed in [13], [14], [22], which also accounts
for strategic behavior of drivers, and which considered two
additional constraints, namely: the driver does not work for
more than nw periods; and that the driver does not work
continuously for more than nc periods. This leads to a non-
cooperative game model, where the Nash equilibrium [25] is
obtained via a bilevel optimization problem. Despite account-
ing for multi-period pricing and driver strategy constraints, it
is important to note that the model still relies on the average
behavior of passengers and drivers. This is in contrast with
our model that accounts for the presence of private individual
preferences of each passenger and driver.
With the introduction of smartphone apps, it is now possible
to exploit large data sets to price and allocate passengers
and drivers. One method is to use a posted-price mechanism
approach for both passengers and drivers. In this two-sided
posted-price mechanism, the provider sets a single price for
all passengers and a single price (in, for example, euros/km)
for all drivers in a given region at a given time. Moreover, the
mechanism can also account for the locations of passengers
and drivers as well as instantaneous supply (availability of
drivers) and demand (number of passenger requests).
5In contrast with the Hackney carriage and dispatcher mecha-
nisms, the two-sided posted-price mechanism optimizes prices
based on the instantaneous properties of the ODT system. In
the case that the provider only considers its profits, a natural
choice of prices is
rD,i = arg max
r
rRiP(r ≤ rmax)
ηD,j = arg max
η
ηP
(
Sj,min + κj(Ri +Rj,i)
1− η ≤ riRi
)
(11)
Note that the key difference between (11) and (10) is the
absence of expectations over distances and durations. This
is due to the fact that the instantaneous and historical data
available to the provider allows for the prices to take into
account real-time properties of the ODT system. The quality
of the solutions in (11) will depend on how effectively the
provider has learned the distributions of ri,max and Sj,min.
All of the mechanisms so far have relied on posted-prices,
where passengers and drivers can either accept or reject offers.
For passengers, it is common to use a posted-price mechanism
as each passenger does not make a sufficient number of re-
quests to make informed choices for the bids that are required
in auction-based approaches. Moreover, there is a concern
that adopting an auction-based approach for passengers would
mean that wealthier passengers are prioritized over others. As
this is an undesirable feature for ODT services designed for
the public, it rules out applying auctions to passenger pricing
(with the possible exception of business focused services [19]).
On the other hand, drivers are paid based on a minimum
profit criterion, raising the question of whether it is desirable
to use auctions to determine driver payments and allocation.
There are three reasons that suggest auctions may play a
useful role for driver pricing and allocation. First, the two-
sided posted-price mechanism in (11) requires estimates of the
pdf both for the maximum price-rate passengers are prepared
to pay and the minimum profit drivers are willing to receive.
If the provider has not been operating for long or is not
using an efficient learning algorithm then the estimates may
not be accurate. Here, it may be desirable for drivers to bid
so that the provider can obtain accurate knowledge of their
profit preferences. This is revealed in an auction, but not in
posted-price mechanisms. Second, auctions often yield higher
revenue than posted-price mechanisms when the pdf of the
driver preferences has large weight in the tails [29]. Thus,
when there is large variation in driver preferences, an auction
may lead to higher revenue for the provider. Third, an auction
to price and allocate drivers has been implemented by Liftago3.
Their success suggests that this approach can be practical. It
is thus important to understand the mechanism’s properties.
Although provider profit is not the only mechanism feature
of interest—average passenger prices and driver profits also
matter—it suggests that hybrid mechanisms where passengers
are priced via a posted-price mechanism and drivers via an
auction may play a useful role in ODT systems. To this end, in
the following sections, we introduce an online hybrid mecha-
nism (Section IV) and study its properties from the perspective
3For more details on Liftago’s hybrid mechanism see [46].
of the allocation of a single passenger request (Section V),
followed by a system level evaluation (Section VII).
IV. THE HYBRID MECHANISM
In this section, we develop the pricing and allocation
mechanism that is run by the provider. We call our approach
a hybrid mechanism since passengers are priced by a posted-
price mechanism and driver payments are determined by a
single-sided auction. As such, it is neither a two-sided posted-
price mechanism nor a classical double auction [47]. Note that
since a posted-price mechanism is used for the passengers,
only one passenger at a time can be priced and allocated to
one of a subset of all available drivers.
In practice, when there are multiple simultaneous requests,
a subset of the available drivers must be selected for each
passenger, a process known as market formation. As we focus
on the pricing and allocation mechanism, we assume that only
one passenger request arrives at a time and that all available
drivers (without a passenger) can potentially be allocated.
In our hybrid mechanism, there are two phases for each
passenger request. In the first, passengers are priced by an
online posted-price mechanism. In the second, phase a driver
is selected via an auction. We detail each phase corresponding
to passenger i ≤ n (i.e., the i-th request) as follows.
A. Phase 1: Passenger Pricing
Phase 1 of the mechanism is run immediately after a
passenger requests a journey. Let K ∈ N and define the price
set P = {ρmaxK , 2ρmaxK , . . . , ρmax}. The price set consists of the
possible price-rates that the provider can offer each passenger.
Note that using a finite set of prices rates is consistent with cur-
rent practice in Hackney carriage or dispatcher mechanisms.
Passenger i ≤ n is then priced according to the following
online posted-price mechanism:
Algorithm 1 Passenger pricing.
Offer: The provider offers passenger i a price pi computed
as follows.
• If 1 < i ≤ K, then set pi = Ri iρmaxK .
• Otherwise, set the price to be
pi = Ri
j∗ρmax
K
(12)
where j∗ maximizes wj +
√
2 log i
nj
, wj = jρmaxK , nj is
the number of times a passenger has been offered the
price wj , nj is the number of times a passenger offered
price wj has accepted, and wj = wjnj/nj .
Response: The passenger either accepts or rejects the offer.
Observe that the mechanism in Phase 1 is online, which
means that prices are adapted as the number of transactions
grows. In particular, Phase 1 is based on the online posted-
price mechanism proposed in [28], which exploits the UCB1
learning algorithm [48]. As such, the mechanism inherits
desirable properties such as truthfulness and known bounds
for the profit loss due to imperfect estimates of the pdf for
the maximum price-rate of each passenger. We explore these
properties further in Section V.
6B. Phase 2: Driver Allocation and Payment
Phase 2 of our hybrid mechanism allocates a driver to the
passenger and determines the payment they receive. Algorithm
2 describes this process for a request from passenger i.
Algorithm 2 Driver allocation and payment.
Driver Identification: The provider identifies those drivers
able to reach passenger i within ∆ minutes.
Offer: Feasible drivers are informed how much passenger i
paid for the service in Phase 1 and the distance Ri, allowing
them to compute their potential profit for transporting i.
Driver Bidding: Each driver makes a sealed bid for the
minimum payment they are willing to receive. The bid for
driver j corresponds to ηj and is only considered if ηj ≥ 0.
Allocation: The provider selects driver j with the highest
bid ηj , with ties broken at random..This driver receives
profit (1 − η∗)riRi − cj,i, where η∗ is the value of the
second highest bid. The provider receives a profit η∗riRi.
Observe that the mechanism in Phase 2 has low commu-
nication requirements. In particular, the driver identification
step reduces the number of drivers that are allowed to bid.
Moreover, the driver bidding step only requires each driver to
make a single bid per passenger request, which is equivalent
(in terms of communication requirements) to the two-sided
posted-price mechanism of Section III. Phase 2’s duration is
short and the bandwidth required is low. Given the simple
strategy in this phase, automating driver bids is also possible.
We also note that there is no guarantee that a driver will be
found in Phase 2 who is willing to transport each passenger
and is able to arrive within ∆ minutes of the request. This
problem can be resolved by allowing the provider to retract the
journey offer and refund any payment made by the passenger.
However, this situation is undesirable and it is therefore
important for the provider to give incentives to drivers to
ensure that at least one driver is willing to transport each
passenger. We explore variations of the mechanism to improve
the proportion of passengers transported in Section VI.
C. Numerical Example
We provide an illustrative numerical example for our hybrid
mechanism. Let pi be the price obtained for passenger i
from the Offer step in Algorithm 1. This price depends on
the distance, Ri, of the journey and previous offers to other
passengers. For concreteness, we assume that pi = 10 euros.
Next, suppose that the passenger is willing to pay 11 euros
for their journey. By the Response step in Algorithm 1, the
passenger accepts. The provider then seeks to find a driver.
Suppose that two drivers are able to reach the passen-
ger within a time, ∆, which in Section VII we take to
be 10 minutes. The provider informs each driver that the
passenger is willing to pay 10 euros for the journey. Each
driver bids ηj , j = 1, 2. For concreteness, we assume that
η1 = 0.6, η2 = 0.4. Since η1 > η2, driver 1 is allocated the
journey and receivers a profit of 6 − ci,j euros, where c1,i
is the cost for driver 1 to reach the pickup location of the
passenger. The provider then receives 4 euros profit.
V. PROPERTIES OF THE HYBRID MECHANISM
In this section, we explore the properties of the hybrid
mechanism. In Section V-A, we show that each phase our
mechanism ensures that passengers and drivers have incentives
to report truthfully. We then consider the effect of historical
data on the profit the mechanism in Section V-B, which leads
to a data-profit tradeoff. In Section V-C we derive bounds to
relate the profit to the passenger preferences and imperfections
in the provider’s estimates.
Throughout this section, we compare the profits obtained
via our hybrid mechanism to a mechanism which has perfect
knowledge of the passenger preference distribution, which we
denote by M∗. In the mechanism M∗, passenger i is priced
via the optimization problem
rM,i = arg max
r∈[0,ρmax]
r
∫ ρmax
r
frmax(x)dx (13)
To simplify notation, we define the expected gross profit based
on a price-rate r as
J(r) = r
∫ ρmax
r
frmax(x)dx (14)
For passenger i, the expected gross profit from our hybrid
mechanism is denoted by J∗H,i, while the expected gross profit
from mechanism M∗ is denoted by J∗M,i = J(rM,i).
A. Truthful Reporting
As Phase 1 is based on an online posted-price mechanism
and Phase 2 is based on a sealed-bid second-price auction,
our hybrid mechanism inherits the truthful reporting properties
of these mechanisms under no collusion. This ensures that
passengers and drivers do not have any incentive to use
reporting strategies that are not straightforward to characterize
by the provider. In particular, the provider can use simulations
to obtain more reliable estimates of its long-term profits, the
profits of drivers and the prices that passengers will pay. These
are important to verify the suitability of the mechanism.
We first consider passenger reports in Phase 1, which
consist of the desired time of pick-up and the passenger’s
accept or reject response. Observe that in Phase 1, the price
for passenger i does not depend on the time passenger i
makes her request nor on whether they accept or reject the
journey. As such, each passenger cannot influence its price
by reporting an earlier or later pick-up time. Moreover, if a
passenger untruthfully reports her accept or reject response,
she will either receive a unwanted journey or miss out on an
opportunity to receive a desirable journey. This means that
passengers will report truthfully.
In Phase 2, only one passenger request is active in each
hybrid mechanism run. Thus, the truthfulness of driver bids
is inherited as a property of sealed-bid second-price auctions,
which are themselves Vickrey auctions [25]. It follows that the
hybrid mechanism is truthful for both passengers and drivers.
B. Data-Profit Tradeoff
We now turn to the tradeoff between historical data available
to the provider and the profit of the mechanism. In particular,
7we consider the sum expected gross profit after n passenger
requests. Our first proposition provides an asymptotic scaling
law for the expected loss of profit by the provider when using
the hybrid mechanism rather than another mechanism:
E[L] = E
[
n∑
i=1
J∗M,i −
n∑
i=1
J∗H,i
]
(15)
Proposition 1. Let K = d(n/ log n) 14 e and suppose that the
parameters of the passenger price preferences satisfy α = 1
and β > 1. Then, E[L] satisfies
E[L] = O(
√
n log n) (16)
The proof of Proposition 1 relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Suppose α = 1 and β > 1. Then the unique
maxima of J(r) in (14) is
r∗ =
ρmax
1 + β
(17)
Proof. The condition for a critical point is
∂
∂r
{
r
∫ ρmax
r
f(x)dx
}
= 0 (18)
Applying the Leibniz rule and evaluating the integral yields
ρmax
β
(
1− u
ρmax
)β
− u
(
1− u
ρmax
)β−1
= 0 (19)
which has the solution
u =
ρmax
β + 1
. (20)
We now show that the point u is the unique maximum of
J(r). Without loss of generality, we focus on the case ρmax =
1 since this only affects the support. Observe that∫ 1
r
1
B(1, β)
(1− x)β−1dx− 1
B(1, β)
r(1− r)β−1 < 0
⇔ 1
β
(1− r)− r < 0⇔ r > 1
1 + β
which implies that J ′(r) < 0 for r > 11+β . Using a similar
argument, it follows that J ′(r) > 0 for r < 11+β . This implies
that u is in fact the unique maximum for J(r).
We now complete the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. Since J(r) has a unique maximum on [0, 1] it follows
that we can apply [28, Theorem 3.14], which states that
E[L] = O(
√
n log n) when K = d(n/ log n) 14 e, from which
Proposition 1 then follows. We note that the statement of
Theorem 3.14 in [28] corresponds to the case ρmax = 1;
however, the result can be extended to ρmax ∈ R+.
We remark that Proposition 1 does not apply to every choice
of αr, βr for the distribution of the maximum price-rate.
However, it holds for a wide range of parameter choices where
the tail of the density as r → ρmax is decaying. Moreover, a
numerical study suggests that the result holds for all α, β. As
passengers are typically less likely to pay for higher priced
journeys, the choices of parameters in Proposition 1 are the
most applicable to ODT systems.
A drawback of Proposition 1 is that it does not provide
any information on the effect of passenger preferences on the
expected loss. However, intuition suggests that the profit loss
E[L] should be smaller for lower values of the variance for
the maximum price-rate ri,max, which we verify next.
C. Influence of Preferences
While Proposition 1 provides insight into how the expected
gross profit varies with the number of requests (corresponding
to the available data), it does not indicate how passenger and
driver preferences affect the performance of the mechanism.
Suppose passenger i is offered a price-rate ri by the hybrid
mechanism in Phase 1, which is typically suboptimal. This
offer can be interpreted in terms of the mechanismM∗, where
the price-rate is optimized using a pdf fˆrmax with parameters
αˆ, βˆ, ρmax. The expected gross profit loss due to the imperfect
estimate fˆrmax is then given by
E[Li] = J∗M,i − ri
∫ ρmax
ri
fˆrmax(x)dx (21)
Due to the dependence on ri arising from the mechanism in
Phase 1, it is not possible to obtain a closed-form expression
for E[Li]. As such, we focus on obtaining a bound to examine
the effect of parameters for passenger preferences on the
profit loss. We begin by considering the upper bound for the
expected gross profit loss.
Proposition 2. Suppose that α = 1 and β > 1, then E[Li] is
given by (22), where ψ is the digamma function.
Proof. Observe that
E[Li] = r∗
∫ ρmax
r∗
f(x)dx− ri
∫ ρmax
ri
fˆ(x)dx
≤ r∗
∫ ρmax
r∗
f(x)− r∗
∫ ρmax
r∗
fˆ(x)dx
≤ r∗
∫ ρmax
0
|f(x)− fˆ(x)|dx (23)
Consider the change of variables y = x/ρmax, which yields
E[Li] ≤ r∗
∫ 1
0
|f˜(y)− ˜ˆf(y)|dy (24)
where f˜ and ˜ˆf are beta pdfs with support [0, 1] and parameters
α, β and αˆ, βˆ respectively.
Note that the integral in (24) is twice the total variation.
Applying Pinsker’s inequality [49] to bound the total variation
in terms of the Kullback-Leibler divergence, DKL, we obtain
E[Li] ≤
√
2DKL(f˜ ,
˜ˆ
f) (25)
which yields the desired result after evaluating the Kullback-
Leibler divergence of beta distributed random variables.
In the special case that α = αˆ = 1 and β, βˆ ≈ 1, we can
obtain further insight into the effect of imperfect knowledge
8Let r∗i be the optimal price-rate in (17). Then,
E[Li] ≤
√√√√2[log(B(αˆ, βˆ)
B(α, β)
)
+ (α− αˆ)ψ(α) + (β − βˆ)ψ(β) + (αˆ− α+ βˆ − β)ψ(α+ β)
]
(22)
of β. In particular, B(1, β) = 1β and ψ(1 + β) = ψ(β) +
1
β .
As such, the bound in Proposition 2 simplifies to
E[Li] ≤
√√√√2[log(β
βˆ
)
+
βˆ − β
β
]
(26)
Since β, βˆ ≈ 1, we obtain the approximation
E[Li] /
√√√√2[β − βˆ + βˆ − β
β
]
(27)
from which it follows that
E[Li] /
√
K|β − βˆ| (28)
where is K is a constant depending only on β and not βˆ. As
such, the bound on E[Li] approximately scales with the square
root of the estimation error.
For providers, it is also of interest to understand how the
mechanism performs in the presence of different passenger
preferences using the mechanismM∗. Suppose that the mech-
anism has perfect knowledge of passenger preferences. Let
r∗α,β be the optimal price-rate with parameters α, β. We then
have the following result.
Proposition 3. Consider two sets of passenger parameters
α, β and α′, β′ such that α = α′ = 1 and β, β′ > 1. Then,
the expected gross profit difference is given by
E[LD] = ρmax
∣∣∣∣∣ ββ(1 + β)β+1 − β′β
′
(1 + β′)1+β′
∣∣∣∣∣ (29)
Proof. Since α = α′ = 1 and β, β′ > 1, we can apply
Lemma 1. In particular, the expected gross profit difference
is — as required — given by
E[LD] =
∣∣∣∣∣r∗1,β
∫ ρmax
r∗1,β
f(x; 1, β)dx− r∗1,β′
∫ ρmax
r∗
1,β′
f(x; 1, β′)dx
∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣ ρmaxβ(1 + β)B(1, β)
(
1− 1
1 + β
)β
− ρmax
β′(1 + β′)B(1, β′)
(
1− 1
1 + β′
)β′ ∣∣∣∣∣
= ρmax
∣∣∣∣∣ ββ(1 + β)β+1 − β′β
′
(1 + β′)1+β′
∣∣∣∣∣ (30)
Observe from Proposition 3 that for large β, β′, the expected
gross profit difference satisfies E[LD] ≈ 0.
VI. VARIATIONS OF THE HYBRID MECHANISM
The hybrid mechanism aims to maximize the provider’s
profit. However, this is not necessarily desirable, e.g., if
the provider seeks to serve more passengers. Similarly, the
provider may wish to modify the mechanism if there are
insufficient drivers willing to bid above the reservation price
in the auction, such as when driver costs are too high.
A key motivation for providers to modify the hybrid mech-
anism is to improve the efficiency, which is is a general notion
in mechanism design. In the context of ODT it is natural to
interpret the efficiency as the proportion of passengers that
accept their offer and have a driver to transport them. That is,
efficiency is the proportion of passengers able to successfully
complete their desired journey and is denoted by E .
There are two modifications the provider can make to the
hybrid mechanism, namely to either adjust the price-rate, or
to introduce driver subsidies. In the remainder of this section,
we detail these variations on the mechanism developed in
Section IV and explore their impact on efficiency.
A. Adjusting the Price-Rate
In the ideal scenario where the provider has perfect knowl-
edge of passenger preferences and has elicited the minimum
profit each driver requires, the profit maximization problem
that the provider aims to solve for each passenger i is
P ∗ = max
r
min
{Sj,min}
Rir
(
1− Sj,min + κj(Ri +Rj,i)
rRi
)
× P(r ≤ ri,max) (31)
This problem can also be written as
P ∗ = max
r
rRiP(r ≤ ri,max)− (S∗ + C∗)P(r ≤ ri,max)
(32)
where S∗ is the minimum profit of the selected driver and
C∗ is the corresponding travel cost. As such, the driver
profit requirements regularize the optimization problem. In
particular, the subtracted term results in a price-rate higher
than the case where only passenger preferences are considered.
We note that the problem in (32) cannot be solved directly
as it is necessary to elicit the driver profit requirements, which
in turn depend on the price-rate that the passenger is charged.
For this reason, a mechanism such as our hybrid mechanism
(as described in Section IV) is required. However, the problem
in (32) illustrates the important dependence of the price-rate
on the efficiency (or equivalently the likelihood that both
passengers and drivers are willing to accept the journey).
To gain further insight into the dependence of efficiency on
the price-rate, consider the probability that at least one driver
9is willing to transport passenger at price-rate r. That is, for a
given passenger i there exists at least one driver j such that
Sj,minτj,i + c(Ri +Rj,i) ≤ rRi (33)
The probability this holds is equivalent to the efficiency E .
To explore the influence of journey parameters on the
efficiency, consider driver j and define the random variable
X = Sj,minτj,i + κj(Ri +Rj,i) (34)
Since X has bounded support determined by
Sj,min, κj , Ri, Rj,i, and τj,i, we model X as a beta
distributed random variable with parameters αX , βX . To
justify this model, observe that for known Ri, Rj,i, τj,i, κj
Sj,min =
X − κj(Ri +Rj,i)
τj,i
(35)
which is the beta distributed minimum driver profit (c.f.,
Sec. II).
With the definition of X , the optimization problem in (32)
can be approximated as
P ∗approx = max
r
rRiP(r ≤ ri,max)Pr(X ≤ Rir) (36)
which corresponds to the optimal profit when the provider
allows only one driver to transport passenger i. This optimiza-
tion problem provides useful insights into the tradeoff between
the expected provider profit per journey and the efficiency of
the mechanism. Observe that as the price-rate increases, both
the approximate profit and the efficiency lower bound increase
before decreasing again for large price-rate r. Intuitively, no
drivers will accept a journey at a low price-rate while no
passengers will accept a journey at a very high price-rate.
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Fig. 1. Plot of the approximate profit (per km) in (36) versus the efficiency.
Parameters: αp = 1, βp = 1, αd = 1, βd = 5, ρmax = σmax = 1, Ri = 1.
Fig. 1 illustrates the tradeoff between profit and efficiency.
A key observation is that the optimal price-rate to maximize
the approximate profit differs from the optimal price-rate to
maximize the efficiency lower bound. Providers seeking to
maximize efficiency will not in general choose the same price-
rate as in the case of profit maximization. This is consistent
with the differences between profit maximization and social
planning objectives considered in auction design [29].
In practice, the provider does not have perfect knowledge of
the efficiency-profit tradeoff curve. However, the information
obtained from early passenger requests can provide clues as
to this curve. In particular, as the online mechanism in Phase
1 explores a range of prices, this data can also be used to
construct an estimate of the efficiency-profit tradeoff curve.
B. Driver Subsidies
The efficiency of the hybrid mechanism is influenced by the
requirement that each driver receive a minimum profit for each
journey, which induces a loop in the profit-efficiency curve (as
illustrated in Fig. 1). In particular, reducing the price-rate does
not necessarily lead to improvements in the efficiency of the
mechanism. This is due to the fact that reducing the price-
rate can also reduce the probability that there exists a driver
willing to transport each passenger.
An alternative method to improve the efficiency of the
mechanism is to introduce subsidies. In particular, when no
driver is able to serve a passenger profitably, the provider
can compensate a driver that would otherwise not meet her
minimum profit criterion. In this case, the provider pays the
driver more than the price it charges the passenger.
While an unbounded subsidy can make every journey prof-
itable for at least one driver, in general the subsidy must be
bounded. This is to ensure that highly unprofitable passengers
are not serviced so that the provider makes a long-term profit.
In the hybrid mechanism, subsidies are implemented by
modifying the reservation price. Instead of requiring that η > 0
for each bid, the broker also accepts negative bids subject
to the restriction that η > ηres where ηres < 0 is the
new reservation price. This increases the efficiency of the
mechanism as drivers with bids
η = 1− Sj,min + κj(Ri +Rj,i)
rRi
< 0 (37)
can still bid for a journey.
To ensure that the provider does not suffer a significant
loss, the reservation price ηres ∈ R is bounded. To evaluate
the effect of the subsidy it is necessary to consider a system
level evaluation which we describe next.
VII. SYSTEM LEVEL EVALUATION
Due to the complexity and spatial-temporal non-
homogeneity of ODT systems, to properly understand
the behavior of any mechanism it must be evaluated at the
system level. In particular, the mechanism must be evaluated
with realistic demand profiles of passenger (i.e., pick-up
and drop-off locations and times), time-varying locations of
available drivers, and city road networks. In this section, we
carry out a simulation-based system level evaluation of our
hybrid mechanism and the variations detailed in Section VI.
In Section VII-A, we provide a detailed description of our
simulation setup. At a high-level, we consider an ODT
provider based in the Hague and build our simulator by
modifying the Mobility Testbed [50], which provides realistic
demand profiles for passengers. In Section VII-B, we detail
the findings from our system level evaluation.
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A. Simulation Setup
To evaluate our hybrid mechanism at the system level, we
simulate the dynamics of the provider and passenger and driver
agents. Our simulator is based on the multi-agent Mobility
Testbed simulation tool for ODT systems. In contrast with
other simulation tools4 for transportation systems built from
scratch (e.g., [51]–[55]) and those based on AnyLogic [56],
MATSIM or SUMO [57], the Mobility Testbed allows for
tracking and modifications of driver routes facilitating the
analysis of routing, scheduling and pricing algorithms.
The Mobility Testbed was originally designed to evaluate
dial-a-ride allocation algorithms [50], [58]. As such, we make
a number of modifications to incorporate taxi mechanisms
and our hybrid mechanism, as well as more realistic driver
behavior. We now describe the setup of our simulator.
We consider an ODT provider based in the Hague over a
period of one day, with a total of 1000 passenger requests and
100 drivers (not all of whom are always available at a given
time). The road network in the simulator is obtained from the
OSM map of the Hague5, from which journey distances are
computed. The region of the city considered is shown in Fig. 2.
Journey durations and passenger requests (pick-up and drop-
off locations) are based on the realistic traffic and demand
models instantiated in the Mobility Testbed [58].
Fig. 2. OSM map of the Hague considered in the simulation study.
We set the maximum waiting time of each passenger, ∆,
to 10 minutes, thereby imposing restrictions on the drivers
that can feasibly transport any passenger. As such, the driver
locations when they are not transporting a passenger affect the
proportion of passengers that are transported (the efficiency)
and also the revenue of the ODT provider.
To account for how drivers choose their location when they
are not transporting a passenger, we adopt a hill-climbing
approach. In particular, each node in the road network is
assigned a probability that a passenger will make a pick-up
request at the node. To determine where each available driver
will travel in the next time period, each node k is assigned a
score which is equal to the sum of the probabilities associated
to each node that can be reached from node k within ∆
minutes. Each available driver then travels to a neighboring
node with the highest score and in the case of a tie, the
4For a detailed survey of simulation tools see [50].
5The Hague OSM map can be found in the Hague benchmark for the Mo-
bility Testbed https://github.com/agents4its/mobilitytestbed/wiki/Benchmarks.
driver selects nodes with equal score uniformly. To obtain the
score for each node, we used a training set 1000 passenger
requests before the simulation began (in a real system, such
pre-training could be performed using existing data available
to the ODT provider). The scores were then updated as the
simulation progressed.
To evaluate our hybrid mechanism, we compared it with
the dispatcher and two-sided posted-price mechanisms. In the
dispatcher mechanism, passengers are offered a price-rate of
2 euros/km and the selected driver is the nearest feasible
one. This driver is paid a 10% commission. If no feasible
driver is found, then the passenger is not transported. The
price-rate was selected as representative of real-world rates. In
the online two-sided posted-price mechanism, passengers and
drivers are priced using Phase 1 of our hybrid mechanism.
For the drivers, the mechanism offers the nearest feasible
driver the minimum acceptable profit.The full details for the
online two-sided posted-price mechanism are provided in
Algorithm 3, where similar to Phase 1 the parameter wp,j
is the average passenger revenue from offering a price-rate
ρmaxj/K and np,j corresponds to the number of times that
price-rate ρmaxj/K has been offered to passengers. For the
drivers, we use a similar pricing scheme also based on UCB1,
where wd,l is the average amount paid to drivers from offering
a payment of σmaxl/K and nd,l corresponds to the number of
times that the payment σmaxl/K has been offered to drivers.
Algorithm 3 Two-sided online posted-price mechanism.
Initialization: Passenger i requests a journey.
if 1 ≤ i ≤ K then
Set pi = Riiρmax/K
else
Set pi = Ri(wp,j∗+
√
2 log i/np,j∗), where j∗ is chosen
to maximize wp,j +
√
2 log i/np,j .
Offer passenger i the journey at price pi.
if pi > pi,max then
Passenger rejects offer, end algorithm.
else
Select closest feasible driver k.
if 1 ≤ i ≤ K then
Sk,i = τk,iiσmax/K.
else
Sk,i = −τk,i(wd,l∗ +
√
2 log i/nd,l∗), where l∗ is
chosen to maximize wd,l +
√
2 log i/nd,l.
Offer driver k the journey with minimum profit Sk,i.
if Sk,i < τk,iSk,min then
Driver rejects offer, end algorithm.
else
Successful transaction: passenger pays pi; driver re-
ceives Sk,i; provider receives pi−κk(Rk,i+Ri)−Sk,i.
Next, we detail our findings for the performance of our
hybrid mechanism and its variations, as well as these two
baseline mechanisms used for comparison. A full summary
of simulation parameters is provided in Table I.
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TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Parameter Parameter Value
Maximum Waiting Time ∆ 10 minutes
αd = βd 1
σmax 0.2 euros/km/minute
αr 1
ρmax 10 euros/km
Number of Drivers 100
Number of Passengers 1000
Duration 24 hours
Vehicle Speed 15 km/hour
Vehicle Cost 1 euro/km
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Fig. 3. Empirical efficiency-profit curve obtained by varying the offered price-
rate in the dispatcher mechanism.
B. Simulation Results
Before evaluating the performance of our proposed mecha-
nism, we first consider the behavior of the dispatcher model
with varying passenger prices. Fig. 3 plots the tradeoff between
the average number of successful journeys and the average
profit received by the provider. The tradeoff is obtained by
varying the price-rate offered to each passenger. Observe that
the shape of the curve is consistent with the efficiency-profit
curve in Fig. 1, obtained via theoretical analysis. As such
under the dispatcher model, it is not possible to simultaneously
maximize the profit and the number of successful journeys.
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Fig. 4. Effect of passenger preferences on the average profit for the proposed,
posted-price (PP) and dispatcher mechanisms.
While it is not possible to simultaneously maximize profit
and the number of successful journeys, it is feasible to sig-
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Fig. 5. Effect of passenger preferences on the success rate for the proposed,
posted-price (PP) and dispatcher mechanisms.
nificantly improve the profit using our proposed mechanism.
Figures 4 and 5 compare the average profit and success rate
for each mechanism for a system with passenger and driver
demand parameters αr = αd = 1, βd = 5. The parameter
βr governs the shape of the beta distribution from which
each passenger’s maximum price-rate is drawn. A larger βr
means that passengers are less likely to have a high maximum
price-rate and can be interpreted as a demand parameter.
In particular, when there is low demand for a journey each
passenger is prepared to pay less.
Observe that the proposed mechanism yields a significantly
higher average profit compared with the posted-price and
dispatcher models. Moreover, the profit and success values
depend on the passenger demand. In particular, observe that
as the passenger demand parameter βr increases the profit
reduces. This occurs as passengers are less likely to have a
large maximum price-rate when βr is large. As already noted,
the average profit for the hybrid mechanism is significantly
higher than for the posted-price mechanism. On the other hand,
the success rate for the hybrid mechanism and the posted-price
mechanism are comparable. The success rate for the dispatcher
mechanism is higher than for the hybrid and PP mechanisms,
at the cost of a significantly lower average profit.
We now study the impact of subsidies introduced in Sec-
tion VI-B for a choice of βr = 1. Table II shows the effect of
introducing the subsidies. As expected, increasing the subsidy
improves the success rate at the cost of the average profit.
In particular, the profit loss corresponding to an improve-
ment of approximately 80 passengers in the success rate is
approximately 640 euros. However, a gain in 20 passengers
corresponds to a profit loss of only 70 euros. This captures
the intuition that there are diminishing gains in how many
passengers can be reliably served.
TABLE II
EFFECT OF SUBSIDIES ON THE AVERAGE PROFIT AND SUCCESS RATE.
Subsidy Level (euros) -1 -5 -10
Hybrid Ave. Profit (euros) 3766 3394 3069
Hybrid Ave. Success (/1000) 417 477 487
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The wide availability of data means that it is possible for on-
demand transport providers to improve pricing and allocation
of passengers and drivers. In this paper, we proposed a hybrid
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mechanism and studied its performance and sensitivity to data
available to the provider from previous passenger requests. We
show that the provider’s revenue loss scales with
√
n log n,
where n is the number of passenger requests the provider has
received. We also compared the performance of the hybrid
mechanism—for realistic models of passengers and drivers—
with a two-sided posted-price mechanism and a mechanism
based on the dispatcher taxi model. Our simulation results
show that the success rate of our mechanism is comparable
with an improvement in the average profit.
In future work, we intend to examine how interactions
between multiple providers and passengers and drivers affect
the mechanism, and what (if any) changes are required to
function in such settings. We also intend to examine whether
more sophisticated mechanisms for routing drivers without
passengers can affect the latter’s profits.
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